At the end of a recent meeting in Kaduna, the Northern Elders Forum (NEF) issued a communiqué, which, among other things, contained an ultimatum to President Jonathan to secure the release of the abducted Chibok girls by the end of October 2014 or forfeit his 2015 re-election bid. Their logic is that by failing to secure the release of the girls, ‘Nigerians (read: the Northern Elders) would be left with the only conclusion that he had forfeited his right to ask for their mandate beyond 2015.’ Their diagnosis of the Boko Haram insurgency is, to say the least, bizarre.
According to them, what fuels the Boko Haram insurgency is a ‘“lack of a strong will at the level of the Presidency, deep-seated corruption, incompetence in governments and in the management of security challenges.” I would contest this logic and argue instead that what fuels the Boko Haram insurgency is the political opportunism the North makes of Boko Haram. More to the point, a calm reading of the complicity so manifestly expressed in that Kaduna ultimatum validates the instincts of many non-northerners, namely that the Boko Haram insurgency is inseparable from a larger northern agenda to frustrate President Jonathan and recapture power.
While many have expressed ‘disappointment’, ‘shock’, ‘rage’, ‘disbelief’ at the position of the Northern Elders Forum, my own reaction is one of relief- that at last, the North (with all due apologies to well-meaning northerners) has made public what we have always known. This should be seen as a welcome development as it, at least, helps us to understand better the roots of Boko Haram. It is important to understand Boko Haram for, as the old saying goes, a problem identified is a problem half solved.
Earlier scholarly and popular attempts at interpreting the Boko Haram terrorism, particularly those situated within the context of the theory of relative deprivation, have left unanswered a number of questions.
In its simplest formulation, the theory of relative deprivation, in explaining political violence, for which terrorism is a variant, seeks to advance the argument that instead of absolute deprivation, the key driver of political violence is the discrepancy, a gap between expected and achieved welfare. Put differently, political violence results from ‘collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation’. It is ‘the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction …that disposes men to violence.’ Attempts at explaining political violence from the perspective of relative deprivation is not new- it dates back to ancient Greece, particularly in Aristotle’s attempt to explain revolution. Aristotle makes the point that ‘revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality rather than an absolute measure.’
In modern times, the theory of relative deprivation became hugely popular with Ted Robert Gurr’s publication of Why Men Rebel. Using the frustration-aggression mechanism originally developed by Dollard, Millard and colleagues, Gurr makes the point that ‘the anger induced by frustration is…a motivating force that disposes men to aggression….’ As it relates to the Boko Haram terrorism, the conditions of wrenching poverty in north eastern Nigeria, home of Boko Haram, have been explained away as the reason for the insurgency.
But this interpretation of Boko Haram throws up a number of questions. Who made the North desperately poor? If Boko Haram is borne out of poverty, how may we explain the fact that Boko Haram terrorism is being prosecuted with sophisticated arsenals of war?
The answers to some of these questions ought to be obvious but for analytical convenience, let us attempt them. Up until Nigeria’s 50th anniversary, she had been (mis)ruled for a cumulative 38 years by northern leaders, all of whom today belong to the NEF. What this means in effect is that those who now parade as northern leaders should be held to account for the desperate poverty in the North. It is equally strange to realize that the North is suddenly waking up to see corruption in government. ’ If Boko Haram is a protest against conditions of deprivation, some prominent NEF members ought to be targets. From all appearances, Boko Haram and the NEF would seem to pursue a complementary mandate, namely, to harass President Jonathan out of the office he assumed by popular mandate of Nigerians and recapture power.
Which explains why every effort by the President to fight Boko Haram has been frustrated by these elements. When he came hard on Boko Haram, and the terrorists were on the retreat, he was accused of human rights violation and a declaration of war against the North. The same NEF threatened to take President Jonathan and the then Chief of Army Staff to The Hague for war crimes. When he soft-pedalled in the light of these orchestrated vociferous criticisms, the ground was laid for the abduction of the Chibok girls. Now, he is accused of being weak and lacking the strong will necessary to end insurgency. We can be reasonably sure that should President Jonathan attempt a hurried and, God forbid, unsuccessful rescue operation that results in the death of the girls as well as the terrorists, he would be accused of ethnic and religious cleansing or war crimes.
Now he is being given an ultimatum to produce the girls – a task they are making hard for him to achieve by their tacit support for the terrorists- or abandon his 2015 re-election bid. This is utter claptrap and must be dismissed as such. It seems to me that while the Boko Haram terrorists are holding the Chibok girls hostage as negotiating bait for the release of its detained members, the NEF is holding 2015 re-election bid of Mr President hostage as its own negotiating bait.
What must be clear to the North is that enlightened self-interest suggests a strong need to put a brake at harassing President Jonathan out of office. It would do the North no good if the Niger Delta people harbour the feeling that Boko Haram is an instrument to harass their own out of power. The Nigerian economy has moved on in spite of the Boko Haram insurgency. It sure will not move on in the event of a re-emergence of an insurgency in the Niger Delta that enjoys the support of the political class. And one needs not be an ex-militant to say so. A word is enough, assuming it is taken seriously by the wise.
Aaron is a Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt. He can be reached at [email protected]