As Nigeria approaches the 16 of January 2016, echoes of the massacre and killings of top Northern and Western Nigerian soldiers and top Northern, Western and Mid Western politicians comes back to mind. The events of that day set in motion a cascade of events that left in its wake many deaths, changes to the political structure of Nigeria and fundamental changes to the fiscal structure of Nigeria.
Some of the changes emanating from those terrible events turned out to be positive. Prior to 1963, Nigeria had 3 regions. Those regions were being led by the respective majority tribes in those regions. The minority groups in those regions were suffering untold neglect and different degrees of discrimination. The minorities of the west campaigned for and was granted a mid west region. The minorities of the East embarked upon Nigeria’s first secession attempt that was brutally put down by Ironsi in 1966 and the North was plagued by the incessant riots by the Tivs and other Northern minorities prior to 1966. The creation of states by Gowon freed the minorities from the oppressive grip of the Northern and Eastern majority tribes and simultaneously tightened the noose around the neck of the rebellious eastern region. The Mid west had been “freed” in 1963.
As the ghost of Biafra again starts to rear its head, certain similarities can be discerned. In 1960 the Eastern dominated NCNC had been in an alliance with the Northern centered NPC. The relative lack of a skilled Northern work force available to the North ensured that most of the skilled working force of Northern extraction were being employed in the Northern region civil service. Ahmadu Bello was concerned to ensure that Northerners were fully employed in the bureaucracy of the Northern region. This meant that the NCNC was left to fill the jobs in the federal bureaucracy with persons of igbo descent without much push back from the Northern dominated NPC. Jaja Wachuku (the federal Education minister) used that power and space to appoint Eni Njoku and Kenneth Dike as the first vice chancellors’ of the Universities of Lagos and Ibadan respectively. The NCNC also influenced the choice of Ironsi as new GOC of the Nigerian army by the Prime Minister over the heads of the more experienced officers with brigade experience at the time. Ademulegun and Ogundipe were recommended to the Prime Minister by the last British GOC of the Nigerian army General Welby -Everard as his more capable replacements (page 243 of the Nigerian Military by Robin Luckham).
The 1964 elections changed matters considerably. The NPC had switched alliance partners from the NCNC to the western region based Nigerian National Democratic Party (“NNDP”). All attempts by Zik to cancel or impede the recognition of that election was thwarted. The relative lack of power concentrated in the office of the President of the Nigeria became all the more apparent. The NNDP took its place at the centre. Akinjide (as the new Education minister) wasted no time changing Eni Njoku with the Cambridge educated Saburi Biobaku. The igbo were fast seeing events moving where its position within the federal government was being threatened by a new alliance between the Northern NPC and the western NNDP. A coup was executed mainly by igbo majors with the assistance of lower cadre officers of different ethnicities unaware of the motives behind the coup plotters actions. Some of the junior non igbo officers believed they were going on a routine training course whilst others were asked a day before to participate in the coup.
It so happened that Zik’s cousin (Ifeajuna) was a lead participant in the coup. It was no coincidence that Zik went missing for over a month until after the coup was given effect to. All people that were political opponents of Zik were gruesomely murdered (whether they be Okotie Eboh within the NCNC or Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Belewa and Akintola of the NCNC and NNDP respectively).
Fast forward to today. Again we have a situation where Jonathans’ government had empowered the igbo to such an extent that most of the truly powerful positions within the Jonathan led federal government were being held by the igbo. Again, political events have thrown up an unlikely and unforeseen change in government. The North and West are now back in the centre of political power and the East is feeling the chill wind of relative lack of power at the federal level under a democratic dispensation.
Like 1965, the igbo have found this state of affairs difficult to comprehend or grapple with. It lacks the people in the army to effect the violent change of government so the 1966 option no longer exists. Its next course has been to threaten secession. Its major problem is it lacks any leverage within the Nigerian socio political structure. The west controlls the economy of Nigeria and could and did ground Nigeria down during the Abiola crisis. The Niger delta’s resources feeds the entire country. It could and did shut the taps off during the MEND crisis. Nigeria had to discuss a more equitable derivation formula. That policy discussion is still ongoing.
The igbo has no such leverage. The economy of the east contributes less than 5% to Nigeria’s GDP. Its people have made a habit of migrating to the four corners of Nigeria to make a living. The country is aware that the SE has insufficient land to house all igbos and if it does manage to contain the igbos there will be no land left to farm for the purposes of feeding such a massive population. It’s need to facilitate easy egress from the SE has made the need for a second Niger bridge a more compelling South East interest for the elites of the igbo than lobbying the federal government for funds to be expended on curbing ravaging effects of large scale erosion within the South East itself.
In a bid to force the Federal Government to take its feelings of neglect seriously, it has opted to attempt to annex not only the liberated parts of the former minority areas of the Eastern region but has added the delta part of the former mid western region. It has tried to turn back the clock of the Biafran defeat and ejection from the former mid west. The igbo dominated IPOB, MOSSOB and BIM now say that despite the near 100% igbo leadership at all levels of all the three organisations, the Biafran struggle is not somehow an igbo struggle but a “biafran” struggle whilst at the same time referencing as their gripe the lack of a 6th state for the South East and the use of federal character for admissions into federal universities (a position ignored by the University of Nigeria Nnsuka). It has ignored the fact that Bayelsa, Cross River, Ebonyi and Rivers are states that had relatively low scores in the tests results that so infuriated the igbo South East. In a nutshell, the Nigerian policies which is giving birth to the new agitation of Biafra are things that uniquely affect the igbos.
The federal government appears to be acting fast. It plans to site a new division of the army in the South South. That is only part of the solution. It must allow greater fiscal federalism within Nigeria. More power should be devolved to the states that allows all states to exploit the resources within their domains. Each state knows their domains better than the federal government. Nigeria has so much oil, gas and solid mineral resources that can be harnessed by a truly serious state government. Each state is blessed with some natural material and human resource that can be efficiently exploited.
The federal government needs to step back and allow the state governments take more control. It can manage and regulate extraction in order to safeguard the environment and have a split in the proceeds of such extraction (50% say). The federal government cannot however run away from this needed institutional reform. It will force many rich states to become rich in actuality. At this point, there is no logical case for any further state creation. The political bureaucracy is large enough. Focus however needs to be placed firmly on fiscal change. Gowon embarked on political change days before Nigeria faced its second secession attempt. I hope President Buhari does not wait to such a time to review Nigeria’s fiscal construction.