No fewer than 900 persons have died in 106 attacks by Boko Haram, ISWAP, and other splinter cells in four Northern states since January 1, 2021, a new report has said.
The report titled, “After the Cat has Reached its Ninth Life, What is Next for the Boko Haram Insurgency?” was released on May 24 by SBM Intelligence, a leading geopolitical intelligence platform.
According to the report, a breakdown of the attacks showed that 12 occurred in Yobe, 91 in Borno, two in Nasarawa, while a lone incident occurred in Adamawa.
The report further showed that 900 lives were lost during the period under review.
Meanwhile, the report examined the implication of the death of Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau on the military’s counter-insurgency operations in the North-East.
Last Wednesday, Shekau was reported to have detonated a suicide vest he had on to avoid being captured by the ISWAP faction, killing himself and ISWAP commanders present in the process.
SBM Intelligence’s report noted that it was the seventh time that Shekau would be declared dead.
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“The major difference this time, however, is that the death did not come at the hands of the Nigerian military but after a clash1 with its splinter faction the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
“Authoritative sources say that ISWAP fighters had attacked Shekau’s base, overpowered his bodyguards and were trying to force him to relinquish power in a meeting when he detonated a suicide vest he had on, killing himself and the ISWAP leadership at the meeting.
“Both factions have increasingly clashed over territory as a result of sustained aerial bombardment of the Lake Chad Islands by the Nigerian Airforce, which has forced ISWAP to seek cover in the Mandara Mountains in Southern Borno, home to the JAS faction,” the report read in part.
The report stated that with Shekau dead, many members of Boko Haram would be integrated into ISWAP.
“However, there is the possibility of some Boko Haram fighters refusing to join ISWAP and leaving the Sambisa Forest area, with Ansaru cells in the North-West as a likely destination or continuing as Boko Haram.
“If they join Ansaru, itself a splinter Boko Haram faction, the group will be strengthened in its resurgence.
“The group was dormant from 2016 until January 20205 when it claimed responsibility for an attack on the convoy of the Emir of Potiskum on the Kaduna-Zaria road, which killed 30 persons, including six Nigerian Army soldiers.
“If they continue as Boko Haram, they could be starting afresh or joining an already existing cell of the group. There are already reports of Boko Haram hoisting its flag in a remote community in Niger State, although the reports do not state which faction of Boko Haram and it is possible that it could be either the ISWAP or JAS faction.
“In either case, it is known that both factions are trying to make inroads into the region and in addition to a resurgent Ansaru, it is likely to become a new theatre of the insurgency as well as bring about clashes between the rival groups.
“For ISWAP, seizing the Sambisa Forest will be a significant plus as it will provide protection from air raids for its fighters currently more exposed in their Lake Chad area strongholds.
“Also, it brings them closer to garrison towns like Maiduguri and Konduga, and access roads leading to them, giving it chokepoints for Maiduguri and have control of all access roads leading to it. This increases the security risks to travellers and even to Nigeria’s military,” the report read.
On the implication of Shekau’s death, SMB Intelligence’s report noted that the military must prepare to confront a more vicious enemy with international connection.
“The ISWAP faction had continuously considered the Shekau-led Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah as a distraction to its enterprise and has desired to have a united front.
“With Shekau now gone, ISWAP poses a graver threat to an already stretched military for a number of reasons ranging from better coordination to more financing, better network and affiliation to IS.
“The fact that ISWAP took out Shekau rather than the Nigerian Military raises its status, a position which is not free of problems, however.
“ISWAP has had a series of leadership crises since its inception, which means this newfound status could lead to more internal squabbles about leadership, which in itself raises the possibility of more splinter factions.
“Another immediate implication of Shekau’s death is that it calls into question the capacities of state actors.
“With various reports over the years of failed attempts to kill Shekau by the Nigerian military and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), his death in the hands of a “technically defeated” non-state actor is embarrassing for the country’s intelligence and military institutions, and could deal a blow to morale, as well as to the prestige of the institution.
“Considering ISWAP’s more clinical approach compared to Boko Haram and its focus on military targets and aid workers, its control of the Sambisa Forest means more problems for the military and the civilian populations in places where they are able to have control over and impose their Islamist rule.
“Additionally, successful conscription of Boko Haram members would mean that the ISWAP group would be better able to traverse the Sambisa area.
“For these reasons, it is important for the military to begin preparations for an escalation in hostilities in the area, and adopt new strategies that will not just sufficiently defend against attacks, but will also take the fight to the terrorists.
“It is vital that the military finds and targets the leadership of ISWAP as this will have more of an impact than killing off its foot soldiers.
“Another clear concern with the ISWAP takeover is that it is a wellconnected terror group with access to military-grade equipment, training and financing from across the world.
“This is likely to be a challenge for the Nigerian government. Tracing and tracking down terror financiers has not proven to be the forte of Nigeria and the country will clearly need more technical support and multinational partnerships to successfully track funds that go to the group.
“The objectives of Boko Haram and ISWAP are also likely to be different as well, due to the respective sources of funding. It is accepted by this stage that funding for Boko Haram is local.
“The Nigerian government claims to be prosecuting what it reported to be hundreds of people in connection with sponsoring terrorism in the country. In ISWAP’s case, their funding is not local, so the growth and operations of the group will be harder to stop.
“Such a scenario presents a greater problem for the government as they cannot lean on local actors to get results in the fight against terrorism,” the report further read.