In May 2013, Nigerian security forces launched a military offensive targeting Boko Haram safe havens after President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in northeastern Nigeria. Despite an initial reduction in Boko Haram attacks, the militant group reestablished a base in Borno State, along Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, and killed more civilians than in any period since its first attack under leader Abubakar Shekau in September 2010.
Although Shekau is Boko Haram’s most visible leader, recent Boko Haram and Ansaru operations suggest that Shekau is not the only leader. This article examines other militant leaders who contributed to the operational and ideological development of Boko Haram and Ansaru, but specifically focuses on Khalid al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur. The article also discusses Adam Kambar, who may have been in contact with Osama bin Laden; Abu Muhammed, whose kidnapping cell targeted foreigners in northern Nigeria; and Kabiru Sokoto and Habibu Bama, who attacked churches in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region.
It finds that Khalid al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur are uniquely capable of expanding Boko Haram’s international connections to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabab, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s factions, al-Qaeda core and other militant groups in Africa. On the local level, al-Barnawi and mid-level commanders from Ansaru are likely operating with Shekau and Boko Haram, but Nur’s ideological disagreements with Shekau may inhibit his followers from collaborating with Boko Haram at this time.
Muhammad Yusuf’s Disciples
Before 2009, Abubakar Shekau was the deputy of Boko Haram leader, Muhammad Yusuf, while Mamman Nur, who reportedly introduced Shekau to Yusuf, was Yusuf’s third-in-command. The three met as theology students in Borno. Yusuf admired the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda (particularly AQIM), while Shekau preached takfiri (excommunication) ideology, but they both focused on their native Nigeria. Nur, who is Cameroonian, may have had an incentive to regionalise Boko Haram’s ideology, and he was the mastermind of the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011.
Nigerian security forces killed Yusuf and 800 of his followers, who called themselves “Yusufiya,” in clashes in July 2009. After this, AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, offered his “Salafist brothers” in Nigeria “men, weapons, and ammunition to gain revenge on Nigeria’s ruling Christian minority” for killing “the martyr Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf” and the deaths of Muslims in clashes with Christians in the Middle Belt.
Dozens of Yusuf’s followers fled Nigeria, including the future commander in Kaduna, Abu Muhammed, who trained in Algeria under the Nigerian Khalid al-Barnawi, the latter of whom was Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s longtime kidnapping and smuggling accomplice. Another follower, Adam Kambar, who was arrested in Kano in 2007 after training with AQIM in Algeria, met al-Barnawi in Algeria in 2011, but became the leader of an AQIM training camp.
Nur was one of Yusuf’s few followers who fled to East Africa (reportedly to Somalia) and trained with al-Shabab and AQIM militants. Kambar was based in Kano, served as the “main link” between Boko Haram and AQIM and al-Shabab, and also financed training for Nigerians with AQIM in Mali for attacks on “Western interests” in Nigeria that Nur would later carry out. Kambar may have facilitated Nur’s meeting with the two African al-Qaeda affiliates, as well as Nur’s return to Kano in early 2011.
Shekau was shot and detained during the July 2009 clashes, which allowed Nur to become leader until Nur left Nigeria and Shekau was released from custody. In July 2010, Shekau announced from a hideout in Borno that he succeeded Yusuf and formed Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad, although it was commonly known as “Boko Haram.” Shekau pledged loyalty to “the amir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the “Islamic states” in Iraq and Somalia, declaring “Oh America, jihad has just begun.”
Nur’s break with Shekau
After returning to Nigeria, Mamman Nur masterminded the UN bombing on August 26, 2011, which killed 21 people in Abuja. Nur coordinated the attack from a base in Kano with two Nigerians who trained with Kambar in Algeria, and a Nigerian militant, Habibu Bama. Bama also carried out the Christmas Day 2011 church bombing near Abuja with Kabiru Sokoto, the commander that Muhammad Yusuf appointed for Sokoto State.
Kabiru received his funding from a terrorist group based in Algeria, which possibly came from Khalid al-Barnawi. This funding likely contributed to Nur’s attack on the United Nations and some of the more than 10 church bombings in the Middle Belt in 2012 that, according to Nigerian security forces, bore the “hallmark of al-Qaeda” and followed Droukdel’s offer of support for attacks on Christians in the Middle Belt.
Nur may also have taken part in the Police Headquarters attack in Abuja on June 16, 2011. This attack, which was the first suicide bombing in Nigeria’s history, involved Kabiru Sokoto and Habibu Bama, and was forewarned by a Boko Haram spokesman who one day before the attack said that “brothers who arrived from Somalia,” possibly referring to Nur, would launch “fierce” attacks in Abuja.
There were rumours that some militants believed Nur’s al-Qaeda connections made him a more competent leader than Shekau. Shekau’s reported favoritism of ethnic Kanuris of Borno also may have driven Hausas, non-Nigerians and other non-Kanuris to ally with Nur, who was also non-Nigerian. Shekau, however, ordered the “death penalty” for anyone who did not follow his orders and killed defectors. This may have been the origin of the split between Boko Haram and Ansaru in 2012.
Al-Barnawi’s unsuccessful collaboration with Shekau
Concurrent with Nur’s operations, Khalid al-Barnawi’s trainee, Abu Muhammed, masterminded northern Nigeria’s first terrorism-related kidnapping of foreigners—a British and Italian engineer—in May 2011. The operation was claimed by “al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel”—a name that reflected the vision of Belmokhtar and his Malian brother-in-law and MUJAO spokesperson, Oumar Ould Hamaha, to expand their zone of operations “throughout the entire Sahara” to Nigeria. Boko Haram’s denial of this kidnapping was likely related to Shekau’s feud over control of funding with Abu Muhammed.
As a result of the feud, Boko Haram reportedly gave information about Abu Muhammed’s shura (council) to the Nigerian security forces, who killed Abu Muhammed and several shura members in Kaduna on March 7, 2012, and uncovered the mortally wounded British and Italian hostages in Sokoto. In addition, this information led security forces to the location of a German engineer who was kidnapped by a Mauritanian-led AQIM cell in Kano in January 2012, which was broken up in May 2012, and to Kambar, who was killed in Kano in August 2012. Other militants connected to Abu Muhammed’s shura, including Kabiru Sokoto and Habibu Bama, were also arrested or killed in 2012.
Due to the break-up of Abu Muhammed’s shura, the three main Nigerian leaders in Boko Haram’s network were Shekau in Borno, and al-Barnawi and Nur in the Middle Belt and Kano.
Local defections and Ansaru’s formation
While Shekau was feeding with other factions, there was also growing local discontent with Shekau. In July 2011, a new group called the Yusufiya Islamic Movement (YIM) released flyers in Borno “distinguishing” the YIM from “evil” Boko Haram, showing concern for the deaths of civilians, and proposing “reconciliation” with the government. The YIM, however, may have been forced out of Borno by Shekau’s killing of defectors and resurfaced as part of Ansaru after Shekau ordered attacks in Kano on January 20, 2012, which killed nearly 200 people, mostly Muslims. Within weeks of the attack, Shekau fled to Gao, northern Mali, which was then governed by MUJAO, after information gleaned from the arrest of one of Shekau’s “new recruits” led security forces to his hideout in Kano.
On January 26, 2012, Ansaru released flyers in Kano announcing its “public formation” and saying it was a “humane” alternative to Boko Haram that would only target the Nigerian government and Christians in “self-defence.” Subsequent Arabic-language Ansaru videos in June 2012 dubbed in Hausa and English and statements to Kaduna-based Desert Herald showed Ansaru employed a pan-West African narrative similar to Mamman Nur and MUJAO. Ansaru also displayed the “setting sun” logo of AQIM’s predecessor before 2007, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), whose commanders included Droukdel, Belmokhtar, al-Barnawi, Kambar, Oumar Ould Hamaha and other future MUJAO leaders. Like the YIM, Ansaru condemned Boko Haram’s killing of Muslim civilians and defectors. In line with Droukdel, Ansaru demanded revenge for the “Christian government’s” violence against Muslims in the Middle Belt, while Ansaru’s charter checked the power of its amir to prevent the emergence of another Shekau.
Al-Barnawi’s renewed role in Boko Haram
Despite al-Barnawi’s suspected role in Ansaru, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that al-Barnawi also operates with Boko Haram. First, Shekau promoted one of al-Barnawi’s deputies, Habibu Yusuf (“Assalafi”), to lead Boko Haram operations in Sokoto in 2012. The Nigerian government’s “most wanted” list, released in November 2012, included al-Barnawi and Assalafi as the first and second ranking members in Shekau’s shura.
Second, only since the French-led intervention in northern Mali in February 2013 has Boko Haram’s new “special kidnapping squad” taken hostage dozens of government officials and their female family members in Borno and released them for imprisoned militants and ransoms that fund more operations. If al-Barnawi’s kidnapping squad is taking hostages and Boko Haram is providing them with safe haven, this would resemble the agreement al-Barnawi’s trainee, Abu Muhammed, made with Shekau in 2011 for Boko Haram to provide cover for his kidnappings before that cooperation was undermined by their feud over funding.
The reconciliation process between Ansaru militants and Boko Haram may have begun in Gao, Mali, where Shekau, Belmokhtar, MUJAO and Boko Haram and Ansaru militants were reportedly based or seen in 2012. In November 2012, for example, an Arabic-language video posted on the Ana al-Muslim network featured Shekau for the first time in a desert with armed militants offering “glad tidings to soldiers of the Islamic State of Mali” and opening with a narration praising Ansaru’s attack on a prison that freed Boko Haram militants in Abuja three days earlier. Subsequent Boko Haram training videos in March 2013 also for the first time opened with photos of al-Shabab leaders, had a higher quality that appeared similar to Ansaru’s videos, were uploaded on popular al-Qaeda online forums instead of YouTube, and featured a mid-level commander in Ansaru’s network, Mummodo Abu Fatima. Fatima is a specialist in suicide operations, and he claimed the Police Headquarters attack in June 2011. He also told Desert Herald in June 2012 that Boko Haram and Ansaru have different interpretations of Islam but may cooperate in the future.
The cooperation between Boko Haram and kidnapping specialists in Ansaru was confirmed when Boko Haram’s intermediary to Agence France-Presse said the kidnapping of a French priest in northern Cameroon in November 2013 was “coordinated with Ansaru.” The priest, like the French family, was taken to Borno and exchanged one month later for a weapons smuggler that Cameroonian President, Paul Biya freed from prison in Cameroon.
Mamman Nur’s status
While it is probable that Shekau and al-Barnawi are cooperating, Boko Haram’s future trajectory may depend on Mamman Nur. Due to Nur’s ideological influence on Ansaru and operational connections to AQIM, al-Shabab and the late Kambar, Nur may be the “Boko Haram” leader communicating with AQIM, al-Shabab, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Pakistan and other al-Qaeda affiliates. Al-Barnawi has connections to Belmokhtar and MUJAO in the Sahel, but it is unclear whether al-Barnawi has Nur’s ability to connect to formal al-Qaeda affiliates like AQIM and al-Shabab. Al-Barnawi, therefore, may be unable to unite Boko Haram with al-Qaeda in the way Shekau sought since his first overture to al-Qaeda in July 2010 and his more recent call after the state of emergency for “brethren” in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria to join “jihad” in Nigeria, to which no al-Qaeda affiliate responded.
Nur and Ansaru are likely still in good standing with al-Barnawi, whose kidnappings rarely harm Muslim civilians, but not necessarily with Shekau. Ansaru, for example, sent “greetings” to al-Barnawi’s longtime co-kidnapper, Belmokhtar, and condemned the Egyptian military’s coup against Mohamed Morsi—as did AQIM and Belmokhtar. Yet in April and September 2013, Ansaru issued its first statements specifically concerning Borno, which condemned Boko Haram’s killing of civilians in attacks that Shekau claimed in Baga and Benisheikh as well as its wanton destruction of churches in Borno and “misunderstanding of the goals of Shari’a.”
As a Cameroonian, Nur may also have played a role in negotiations with the Cameroonian government after Ansaru “coordinated” the hostage-takings with Boko Haram in northern Cameroon. In addition, Nur may be the highest-ranking AQIM-connected militant in Ansaru’s network.
Conclusion
Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur are the three most influential leaders in Boko Haram’s network.
Nur is connected to al-Qaeda affiliates in Africa and is an operational and ideological leader. He likely cooperates with al-Barnawi and Ansaru militants now in Boko Haram, but opposes Shekau’s style of leadership in Borno. Nur, therefore, was likely based in Kano with former followers of Muhammad Yusuf, who were dissatisfied with Shekau and have an internationalist outlook. Nur could, however, become less relevant because some of his key contacts to AQIM, al-Shabab and al-Qa`ida core are dead or in prison, and al-Barnawi’s suspected reintegration with Shekau may isolate Nur in Kano.
Khalid al-Barnawi is regionally connected, but unless he cooperates with Boko Haram, he will lack grassroots support in Nigeria because he operated for years in the Sahel and has a few religious credentials. Al-Barnawi is likely willing to carry out kidnappings with Ansaru, Boko Haram, MUJAO, AQIM or any other militant group regardless of ideology. He may have drifted from Ansaru towards Boko Haram or formed new cells under Shekau, similar to how Belmokhtar unilaterally “drifted” from AQIM’s central leadership in favour of “for-profit” kidnappings and smuggling.
Shekau is a divisive leader, but has legitimacy because he was Yusuf’s deputy and remained close to grassroots followers in Borno. He likely retains a core group of loyalists because many militants who opposed him, such as the YIM and Ansaru, already defected or were killed by Boko Haram, leaving only the more ruthless and indoctrinated militants with Shekau.
If Shekau is killed, a scenario could emerge where al-Barnawi takes over Boko Haram operationally and Nur takes over ideologically, but this is unlikely because both al-Barnawi and Nur lack sufficient grassroots networks in Borno, where Boko Haram carries out more than 80 per cent of its attacks. Although Nur was close to Muhammad Yusuf and al-Barnawi is a skilled kidnapper with Sahelian connections, Shekau’s current sub-commanders, whose aliases are not revealed publicly but are shared with Boko Haram internally, would likely compete to succeed Shekau.
At the same time, Shekau’s death could create opportunities for the Nigerian government to negotiate with former YIM, Ansaru or Kano-based militants, whose current efforts to maintain dialogue are irrelevant as long as Shekau is opposed to reconciliation. Boko Haram’s informing on rival factions to security forces and negotiations with the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments over hostages suggest, however, that Boko Haram is not as “faceless” as the Nigerian government portrays, and that it is possible to communicate with Boko Haram’s leaders.
This leadership analysis also leads to the conclusion that Ansaru, with its most recent operations in Niger, Cameroon and possibly Central African Republic, now functions like an “external operations unit” in its self-declared area of operations in “Black Africa” in a way that separates Ansaru from Boko Haram in Borno and avoids conflict with the group. The organizational structures of Boko Haram and Ansaru are permeable, which will allow mid-level militants to operate with Boko Haram, Ansaru and MUJAO as long as they do not run afoul of Shekau. The regionalisation of Boko Haram and Ansaru, with hostage-takings of wealthy individuals and weapons smuggling in Nigeria and Cameroon, also risks creating a multi-million dollar “terrorism economy” in the southern Sahel that fuels corruption and raises tensions between neighbouring countries and the region’s Muslims and Christians.
Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Foundation and consultant on countering violent extremism, international law of freedom of association, and socio-cultural analysis for geospatial visualisation.
Source: Combating Terrorism Center (www.ctc.usma.edu)